The Court narrowed the availability of primary assumption of risk significantly, suggesting that, in the aftermath of the state's move to comparative fault, it should only be available in athletic injury claims. According to the Court,
The doctrine of assumption of risk does not, and cannot, sit comfortably with comparative causation. In the end, its retention is most persuasively justified not on the ground of doctrinal or practical compatibility, but simply for its utility in "facilitat[ing] free and vigorous participation in athletic activities" ...
We have recognized that athletic and recreative activities possess enormous social value, even while they involve significantly heightened risks, and have employed the notion that these risks may be voluntarily assumed to preserve these beneficial pursuits as against the prohibitive liability to which they would otherwise give rise. We have not applied the doctrine outside of this limited context and it is clear that its application must be closely circumscribed if it is not seriously to undermine and displace the principles of comparative causation...
No suitably compelling policy justification has been advanced to permit an assertion of assumption of risk in the present circumstances. The injury-producing activity here at issue, referred to by the parties as "horseplay," is not one that recommends itself as worthy of protection, particularly not in its "free and vigorous" incarnation...
This decision brings New York law in line with developments in other jurisdictions limiting the availability of primary assumption of risk in non-contact sport situations. See my post, "Is Potato Sack Racing a Contact Sport?", for further discussion.
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